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Abstract
Diagnosis of patients with a disorder of consciousness is very challenging. Previous studies investigating resting state
networks demonstrate that 2 main features of the so-called default mode network (DMN), metabolism and functional
connectivity, are impaired in patients with a disorder of consciousness. However, task-induced deactivation – a third main
feature of the DMN – has not been explored in a group of patients. Deactivation of the DMN is supposed to reflect
interruptions of introspective processes. Seventeen patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS, former
vegetative state), 8 patients in minimally conscious state (MCS), and 25 healthy controls were investigated with functional
magnetic resonance imaging during a passive sentence listening task. Results show that deactivation in medial regions is
reduced in MCS and absent in UWS patients compared to healthy controls. Moreover, behavioral scores assessing the level
of consciousness correlate with deactivation in patients. On single-subject level, all control subjects but only 2 patients in
MCS and 6 with UWS exposed deactivation. Interestingly, all patients who deactivated during speech processing (except for
one) showed activation in left frontal regions which are associated with conscious processing. Our results indicate that
deactivation of the DMN can be associated with the level of consciousness by selecting those who are able to interrupt
ongoing introspective processes. In consequence, deactivation of the DMN may function as a marker of consciousness.
Citation: Crone JS, Ladurner G, Ho ¨ller Y, Golaszewski S, Trinka E, et al. (2011) Deactivation of the Default Mode Network as a Marker of Impaired Consciousness:
An fMRI Study. PLoS ONE 6(10): e26373. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026373
Editor: Tianzi Jiang, Institute of Automation, Chinese Academy of Sciences, China
Received May 27, 2011; Accepted September 26, 2011; Published October 19, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Crone et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by the Jubila ¨umsfonds of the National Bank of Austria (grant number 13643) and by the Paracelsus Medical University
Salzburg Research Funding (grant number R-09/02/005-KRO). The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or
preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: j.crone@neurocognition.org
Introduction
Patients with a disorder of consciousness (DOC) like patients in
the vegetative state and patients in minimally conscious state
(MCS) have survived severe brain injury to a state of wakefulness
with no or minimal awareness of themselves and their environ-
ment (see Laureys et al. [1] and Owen et al. [2] for further review).
As postulated by the European Task Force on Disorders of
Consciousness to avoid associations with a vegetable-like condition
[3], we will further refer to patients in the vegetative state as
patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS). Patients
with UWS are, by definition, not conscious aware and show no
evidence of voluntary behavior; whereas patients meeting the
diagnosis criteria of MCS have recovered from UWS demonstrat-
ing inconsistent but observable signs of consciousness [4]. Accurate
diagnosis is very challenging. Studies report that more than one-
third of these patients are misdiagnosed [5,6,7]. In fact, 9% of
patients with DOC were able to willfully modulate their brain
activity during mental-imagery tasks in a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) study [8]. The high percentage of
misdiagnoses encouraged many scientists to test different para-
digms in imaging and electrophysiological studies to find reliable
markers for diagnosis and prognosis [9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,
17,18,19,20,21]. In the course of these investigations, the so-
called default mode network (DMN) has become an important
focus of interest. Coherent spontaneous low-frequency fluctuations
in the resting brain are organized into distinct brain networks such
as the DMN [22] including medial parietal and frontal brain
regions like the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the ventral
anterior cingulate cortex (vACC) [23]. In healthy subjects, a
resting state network like the DMN is characterized by, first, high
metabolism during resting state [24,25]; second, functional
connectivity during rest [26]; and third, deactivation during
various attention-demanding cognitive tasks [27,28]. Yet, only 2 of
the 3 main features of the DMN have been investigated in a group
of DOC patients. First, global cortical metabolism during the
resting state is reduced by 40–50% in patients [16], and especially
in medial parietal and frontal regions, metabolism is systematically
impaired [29]. Second, Vanhaudenhuyse and colleagues [30]
could demonstrate a reduced functional connectivity of the DMN
and a correlation with the level of consciousness. The third feature
of the DMN, task-induced deactivation, has only been assessed in
a single-case study in which an UWS patient showed a reduced
pattern of deactivation in regions of the DMN compared to the
time of recovery 7 months later [31]. This finding implies that
deactivation of the DMN may be related to conscious processing.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e26373Further, deactivation in medial parietal regions and medial frontal
regions is hypothesized to reflect interruptions of introspective
processes to engage in attention-demanding actions [32]. While
resting-state connectivity is probably not directly related to
different states of consciousness but to a more basic function of
cognitive processing [33], deactivation of the DMN is a target-
directed reaction to attention-demanding stimuli and, therefore,
may clarify additional aspects concerning the state of conscious-
ness. We assume that only those patients with more preserved
cognitive functions will be able to interrupt ongoing mental
processes and, therefore, show deactivation. Thus, deactivation of
the DMN may provide additional information for diagnosis and
may offer new insights on the functionality of the DMN
throughout cognitive tasks and rest. In this study, the DMN has
been investigated in 25 patients with DOC during a passive
sentence listening task to explore the additional information value
of group and single-subject task-induced deactivation patterns.
Materials and Methods
Subjects
The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee (Ethics
Commission Salzburg/Ethikkommission Land Salzburg; number
415-E/952). Written informed consent was obtained according to
the Declaration of Helsinki from all control subjects and from the
families or guardianship of all patients. All participants were
capable of the German language.
Twenty five age-matched healthy subjects (10 men and 15
women; mean age 49 years; age range 22–70 years) were recruited
at the Paris Lodron University of Salzburg. None of the subjects
had a neurological or psychiatric disease history. Thirty patients
with DOC (10 patients in MCS; 20 patients with UWS) were
examined for this study. Because of severe motion artifacts in both
sessions, 5 patients (2 patients in MCS; 3 patients with UWS) were
excluded from the present analysis. Patients were clinically
investigated once a week during in-patient stay using standardized
scales, i.e. the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised (CRS-R) [34] and
the Wessex Head Injury Matrix [35]. A summary of all 25
included patients (8 patients in MCS; 17 patients with UWS) is
displayed in Table 1. The mean age of the group of UWS patients
(12 men; 5 women) was 52 years with a range from 29 to 78 years.
The mean age of the group of MCS patients (7 men; one woman)
was 48 years with a range from 19 to 77 years. All patients
participating in this study showed preserved auditory functioning,
largely preserved brainstem reflexes, and a fairly preserved sleep-
wake-cycle based on assessments of the neurologists in charge.
Table 1. Patients’ information.
Subjects Sex Age Etiology Time since onset (in days) At the time of fMRI
Diagnosis CRS-R
MCS
MCS01 M 77 Hypoxic 34 MCS 0/2/1/1/0/0
MCS02 M 59 Traumatic 85 MCS 3/3/1/1/0/3
MCS03 F 46 Traumatic 2960 MCS 1/2/2/1/0/1
MCS04 M 51 Traumatic 102 MCS 2/3/1/1/0/2
MCS05 M 37 Hypoxic 69 MCS 1/2/2/1/0/2
MCS06 M 47 Traumatic 49 MCS 1/2/1/1/1/2
MCS07 M 47 Traumatic 52 MCS 2/2/1/1/0/2
MCS08 M 61 Traumatic 116 MCS 3/0/4/1/0/2
UWS
UWS01 M 59 Traumatic 116 UWS 1/0/1/1/0/0
UWS02 M 47 Hypoxic 27 UWS 0/0/1/0/0/0
UWS03 M 44 Traumatic 1456 UWS 0/0/1/1/0/0
UWS04 M 68 Hypoxic 74 UWS 1/0/1/1/0/0
UWS05 M 36 Traumatic 347 UWS 0/0/1/0/0/0
UWS06 M 50 Hypoxic 204 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/2
UWS07 M 69 Hypoxic 58 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/2
UWS08 F 39 Hypoxic 74 UWS 1/1/1/0/0/1
UWS09 M 47 Hypoxic 65 UWS 2/1/2/1/0/2
UWS10 F 29 Traumatic 105 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/0
UWS11 M 78 Hypoxic 39 UWS 1/0/0/1/0/0
UWS12 F 47 Traumatic 51 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/0
UWS13 M 63 Hypoxic 16 UWS 1/0/1/1/0/0
UWS14 M 51 Hypoxic 30 UWS 0/0/0/1/0/0
UWS15 M 50 Traumatic 165 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/1
UWS16 F 51 Hypoxic 1470 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/2
UWS17 F 49 Hypoxic 40 UWS 1/0/2/1/0/2
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026373.t001
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sedated at time of scanning.
Stimuli
Control subjects and patients were scanned while listening to 64
short sentences in 2 sessions containing a true or false meaning
(e.g. ‘strawberries are red’ vs. ‘strawberries are blue’) created to
attract attention. Sentences were recorded in German language by
an Austrian male speaker with Cool Edit Pro 2.00 (1992–2000
Syntrillium Software Corporation). Stimuli were presented via
headphones with Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems)
in a pseudo-randomized order in 2 sessions (block-design: 8 blocks
in each session; duration of each block: 16 sec; 4 sentences in each
block). Control subjects and patients were instructed to lie still and
carefully listen to the sentences.
Data acquisition
Because data acquisition of patients was performed over a long
period of time, patients’ and controls’ fMRI data were acquired
using a 1.5 T scanner (Philips Gyroscan Intera) and two 3 T
scanners (Philips Achieva and Siemens TIM TRIO) due to
hardware changes at the clinical setting. Number of control
subjects and patients were matched for field strength. Six control
subjects, 2 patients in MCS and 4 with UWS were scanned with
the 1.5 T Philips scanner. Four control subjects, 4 MCS and 10
UWS patients were scanned with the 3 T Philips scanner. For both
Philips scanners, 134 T2*-weighted images were obtained with a
gradient echo-planar sequence (EPI) in axial plane (25 slices with a
thickness of 4.5 mm and an inter-slice gap of 0.5 mm; matrix
size=64664; FoV=210 mm
2; TR=2200 ms; TE=45 ms; flip
angle=90u). The data of the remaining 15 control subjects, 2
MCS and 3 UWS patients were acquired with the 3 T Siemens
scanner. Again, 134 T2*-weighted images were obtained with a
gradient EPI in axial plane (25 slices with a thickness of 4.5 mm
and an inter-slice gap of 0.5 mm; matrix size=80680;
FoV=210 mm
2; TR=2200 ms; TE=30 ms; flip angle=70u).
In addition, T1-weighted MPRAGE sequences for anatomic
information were acquired for each participant.
Data analysis
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using
Statistical Parametric Mapping (version SPM5; Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK; http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). The first 6 functional scans were
considered as dummy scans and were discarded. Preprocessing
steps included the following procedures: realignment to compen-
sate for motion; unwarping (adjustment for movement-related
artifacts); normalization of an average image of 128 images onto
the MNI EPI template (because of the partially severe lesions in
the patients’ brain, affine only normalization was performed, i.e.,
no nonlinear functions); spatial smoothing using a Gaussian
Kernel of 5 mm full width at half maximum. Voxel extent was
resized to 36363 mm. For single-subject statistical analysis,
voxel-wise statistical parametric maps were generated for each
subject. Each stimulus onset was modeled by a canonical
hemodynamic response function. Data were filtered with a
high-pass cut-off of 128 sec. For minimization of the impact of
artifacts in fMRI time series data, a general linear model (GLM)
regression using weighted least squares in combination with an
autoregressive approach was implemented during Restricted
Maximum Likelihood (ReML) parameter estimation [36]. Since
there were no differences between true and false sentences in
regions of the DMN which showed significant deactivation in the
control group at a threshold level of p=0.01, uncorrected,
sentences were pooled for statistical analysis. In 16 patients, one
of the 2 sessions had to be excluded due to artifacts. In these
cases, only the remaining session was used for further analysis.
For group analysis, subject-specific contrast images were entered
into a voxel-based 2
nd level analysis with scanner type as a
covariate. All results for the group analysis were thresholded at
p.0.05, corrected for FWE at a whole brain level. For activity
analysis on the single-subject level, pooled sentences were
contrasted against rest. To focus on deactivations within the
DMN, data were masked with the original image of the meta-
analysis of DMN functional heterogeneity supplied by Angela R.
Laird [23]. In addition to the masked voxel-based analysis, a
region of interest (ROI) analysis was accomplished by extracting
the mean contrast estimates at whole brain level for each main
region of the default mode network and each participant (with a
sphere of 6 mm radius) to perform t-tests and univariate analysis
of variance. To account for differences between control subjects
and patients, scanner type was implemented as a covariate.
Additionally, mean contrast estimates were extracted for the
following 3 regions which are involved in speech processing [37]:
left superior temporal gyrus, left inferior frontal gyrus (lIFG), and
the left precentral gyrus. Regions of interest within the DMN
were chosen as follows: medial parietal (precuneus and PCC);
medial frontal (vACC and medial prefrontal cortex); right middle
temporal gyrus (rMTG); left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG). For
the exact coordinates see Table S1. This selection was considered
because medial parietal and frontal, as well as middle temporal
regions are regarded as the most essential for the DMN [24]. It
should be noted that Fox and Raichle define these middle
temporal regions as lateral parietal cortex in their review.
However, the coordinates stated by Shulman et al. [28] are
quite identical with those labeled as middle temporal gyrus by
Laird et al. [23]. In addition to the level of deactivation, the
extension of the deactivation pattern can also be a subject of
interest and may provide further information. Therefore, the
number of deactivated voxels in each region was also investigat-
ed. ROI analysis was performed with SPSS (version 14; SPSS
inc.; www.spss.com). Spearman correlation between time of onset
and contrast estimates of each region, two-tailed, and Pearson
correlation between CRS-R scores of the patients and contrast
estimates of each region, one-tailed, were performed as well. To
see if there was a relation between an absence of deactivation
pattern and no response to auditory stimuli, contrast estimates
between activation in the left superior temporal gyrus and
deactivation in the DMN in patients were correlated. Because
gender has an influence on brain networks [38] and because
there are proportional sex differences between the control group
and the patients’ groups, additional t-tests were calculated for
differences in contrast estimates for each region of the DMN
between men and women. The same was done for potential
differences in etiology for the patients’ groups.
Results
Voxel-based analysis at group level
The control group showed wide-spread deactivation in medial
parietal regions, t(23)=7.43, p=0.005, and medial frontal regions,
t(23)=7.16, p,0.009, all corrected for family-wise error (FWE).
Deactivation in the rMTG and lMTG were not significant for
multiple corrections. Results are displayed in Figure 1. The MCS
and the UWS group, in contrast, failed to show a significant
deactivation effect. The MCS group showed deactivation only
when lowering the threshold to p=0.01, uncorrected. The UWS
group, in contrary, showed no deactivation at all.
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Results oftheROIanalysisaredisplayedinTable2 and Figure2.
A main effect of group for contrast estimates was detected in medial
parietal regions and in the rMTG. The control group showed
significant deactivation in both medial regions and in the rMTG.
The MCS and UWS group demonstrated no significant deactiva-
tion.Comparingcontrastestimatesbetweengroups,controlsubjects
demonstrated more deactivation in rMTG and lMTG compared to
patients in MCS; and more deactivation in medial parietal regions,
in medial frontal regions, and in the rMTG compared to patients
with UWS. Between MCS and UWS patients, a trend towards
differences in contrast estimates could be detected in medial parietal
regions but was not significant when adjusting for multiple
corrections. Results concerning the number of deactivated voxels
did not offer any additional information (data not shown).
Additional analysis at group level
A correlation between CRS-R scores of the patients and
contrast estimates in medial parietal regions (r=0.380, p=0.031)
and in medial frontal regions (r=0.61, p=0.001) could be
detected. Correlations of the rMTG and lMTG were not
significant. Differences in contrast estimates between patients with
traumatic origin and patients with hypoxic origin were not
significant, t(23),1.66, p.0.11. Furthermore, correlations be-
tween time since onset and contrast estimates were not significant,
r,0.21, p.0.31. Sex differences in contrast estimates were not
significant, t(58),1.931, p.0.24, either.
Voxel-based analysis at the single-subject level
Results of the voxel-based analysis at the single-subject level
revealed that all controls deactivated in the DMN during sentence
processing at a threshold level of p,0.001, uncorrected (see Table
S2). The patients, in contrast, exposed an abnormal and reduced
deactivation pattern: Only 8 patients (32%), i.e., 2 patients in
MCS (25%) and 6 patients with UWS (35%), showed signs of
deactivation. Patients with a deactivation pattern showed a
significantly reduced number of deactivated voxels in the DMN
as a whole compared to controls, t(31)=3.05, p,0.005. All
subjects of the control group and all patients except for 3 with
UWS showed activation in the left superior temporal gyrus during
stimuli presentation at a threshold level of p,0.001, uncorrected
(see Figure S1 to compare activation between patients). Correla-
tions of the contrast estimates between activation in the left
superior temporal gyrus and deactivation in the DMN in patients
were not significant (r(25)=0.183, p=0.381). Interestingly, all
patients showing a deactivation pattern demonstrated further
activation in left frontal regions (p,.001, uncorrected), i.e. in the
left inferior frontal gyrus and the left precentral gyrus, except for
one patient with UWS (UWS16) who had large lesions in exactly
these regions (see Figure S2). Additionally, 6 out of 17 patients who
did not show a deactivation pattern (3 in MCS; 3 with UWS) also
demonstrated activation in these areas (see Table S2). To confirm
that activation in left frontal regions and deactivation in the DMN
are related in patients, an additional Yates’ chi-square goodness of
fit test was calculated, x
2(1)=4.03, p=0.045.
Discussion
The results of our study indicate that deactivation in medial
regions of the DMN is reduced in MCS and absent in UWS
compared with healthy control subjects. At the single-subject level,
17 out of 25 patients (6 MCS patients; 11 UWS patients) did not
Figure 1. Deactivation of the DMN in the control group during sentence processing. Images display BOLD signal changes overlaid on a
canonical template and transformed into standard MNI space. For display purposes, results are thresholded at p,0.001, uncorrected.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026373.g001
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showing a deactivation pattern (except for one) demonstrated
activation in left frontal regions during speech exposure. Further, a
significant relation between the CRS-R scores of the patients and
deactivation in medial parietal and medial frontal regions was
identified.
First of all, it is important to state that most of the patients did
not express a significant deactivation pattern while almost all of
them demonstrated activation in the superior temporal gyrus
during speech exposure (except for 3 UWS patients, see Figure
S1). Thus, an absence of deactivation cannot be explained by the
means of a broad lack of reactivity to auditory presented speech.
Consistently, correlations between activation in the left superior
temporal gyrus and deactivation in the DMN were not significant.
Subjects in deep sedation, for example, also show activation in
temporal regions during language processing but no activation in
prefrontal regions, which are associated with higher-level semantic
processing [37]. The authors relate the reduced activity in
prefrontal areas to reduced awareness of speech, and the preserved
activity in temporal regions to unconscious processing. Conse-
quently, regions of the DMN do not simply deactivate due to an
unconscious processing of auditory presented sentences.
Second, although it is not understood what activity of the DMN
during the resting state really implies, it seems reasonable that
deactivation in medial regions is linked to a functional interruption
of an ongoing mental stream – whatever it may indicate – to make
resources available that are necessary to focus attention on the
demands of the task [39,40]; and that this interruption goes along
with a more conscious processing of stimuli allowing the person to
remain aware of external events [41]. In line with these
considerations, the process of interruption appears to be reduced
in MCS patients compared to healthy controls and absent in
patients with UWS as displayed in Figure 2. The significant
relationship between CRS-R scores of the patients and the level of
deactivation within medial parietal and medial frontal regions
confirms the assumption that the ability to deactivate is associated
with the level of consciousness. This may not be a surprising result
because it corresponds with findings of previous studies investi-
gating functional DMN connectivity in patients with DOC
[30,42]. However, the interesting question here is does deactiva-
tion provide additional information in respect to differentiation of
diagnosis in DOC patients?
While investigation of DMN connectivity demonstrates a
relation to the level of consciousness, it can still be identified in
altered states of consciousness like in deeply anaesthetized
monkeys [43], and in healthy subjects during light sedation [44]
and during sleep [45]. These findings imply that resting state
connectivity cannot exclusively reflect the level of consciousness
(see Boly et al. [33] for a review). In contrast, deactivation of the
DMN is a response to external stimuli which most likely occurs in
the course of target-directed and probably attention-focused
processing. Thus, the ability to deactivate is based on more
specific processes of perception. In our study investigating
deactivation of the DMN, a few patients with the ability to
deactivate could be detected and distinguished from others who
did not demonstrate deactivation. All control subjects but only 2
patients in MCS and 6 with UWS showed a deactivation pattern.
Both MCS patients showed a wide-spread deactivation pattern
quite similar to those of controls, which was present even when
correcting for FWE at a threshold level of p=0.05 (Figure S3).
Besides, all patients with a deactivation pattern exposed activation
in areas involved in higher-order language processing during
auditory sentence presentation (except for one who had large
lesions in the lIFG and left precentral gyrus as shown in Figure S2).
Correspondingly, results of the chi-square test indicate an
association between deactivation in the DMN and activation in
left frontal regions in patients. Activation in these areas is
considered to reflect conscious awareness of speech [37]. This
suggests that patients who deactivate may have some preserved
functions of conscious processing.
On the other hand, 6 other patients also showed activation in
these prefrontal and precentral regions during speech processing
although they did not demonstrate task-induced deactivation. But
this finding actually corresponds quite well with the hypothesis
Table 2. Results from region of interest analysis.
Contrast estimates
Anatomical Regions F-value t-value p-value
*
Controls
Medial parietal 26.31 .0.001
Medial frontal 23.89 0.004
rMTG 24,05 .0.001
lMTG 0.74 1
MCS
Medial parietal 21.28 0.960
Medial frontal 20.59 1
rMTG 20.60 1
lMTG 2.06 0.312
UWS
Medial parietal 1.45 0.672
Medial frontal 1.38 0.744
rMTG 1.59 0.528
lMTG 1.19 1
All groups
Medial parietal 7.81 0.004
Medial frontal 3.76 0.124
rMTG 5.27 0.036
lMTG 1.53 0.228
Controls vs. MCS
Medial parietal 20.51 0.612
Medial frontal 21.89 0.068
rMTG 22.28 0.032
lMTG 22.59 0.016
Controls vs. UWS
Medial parietal 24.58 ,0.001
Medial frontal 22.99 0.020
rMTG 23.59 0.004
lMTG 21.16 0.968
MCS vs. UWS
Medial parietal 22.02 0.055
Medial frontal 21.21 0.239
rMTG 20.15 0.886
lMTG 0.74 0.465
MCS, patients in minimally conscious state; UWS, patients with unresponsive
wakefulness syndrome; rMTG, right middle temporal gyrus; lMTG, left middle
temporal gyrus; DMN, default mode network;
*adjustment for multiple comparisons.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026373.t002
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ongoing processing to focus attention. If attention is focused
during a language task, higher-order language processing will be
the consequence. On the contrary, attention focusing is probably
not a necessary requirement for higher-order language processing.
This could be an explanation for the finding that principally all
patients with a deactivation pattern showed fairly preserved
activation in frontal areas, while not all patients with preserved
frontal activity in response to speech showed deactivation within
the DMN.
A limitation to this study is that the difference between MCS
and UWS patients in medial regions is not significant when
adjusting for multiple corrections. Hence, the difference between
MCS and UWS can only be stated as a trend. In conjunction with
the association between CRS-R scores and deactivation in the
patient group, though, we conclude that there is indeed a relation
between deactivation in the DMN and the level of consciousness.
Patients are divided into groups based on cut-off values. In reality
though, UWS and MCS are a continuum and not as clearly
dissociable as it may seem.
However, the present interpretation seems to stand in contrast
to the results at single-subject level. At group level, there is a
correspondence between diagnosis and CRS-R scores, respective-
ly, and deactivation in the DMN. When looking at the single-
subject level, though, the percentage of patients showing a
deactivation pattern is a bit higher in the UWS group (25% of
MCS patients and 35% of UWS patients). When considering that
those 2 analyses are based on 2 different dimensions, this
inconsistency becomes more understandable. At the single-subject
level, the existence of a condition, in particular a deactivation
pattern is measured exceeding a given cut-off. At the group level,
the strength of deactivation as a continuum is reflected
independent of its significance. Besides, this contradicting
distribution between MCS and UWS corresponds empirically
Figure 2. Strength of deactivation during sentence processing between groups. Image displays deactivation in healthy controls, patients
in minimally conscious state (MCS), and patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) in the 4 main regions of the DMN: medial parietal
regions; medial frontal regions; right middle temporal gyrus (rMTG); left middle temporal gyrus (lMTG). Bars represent mean contrast estimates and
standard error of mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026373.g002
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paradigms at a single-subject level. In the study by Monti et al. [8],
17% of the UWS patients but only 3% of the MCS patients were
able to willfully modulate their brain activity. Coleman and co-
workers [46] found similar neuronal markers for language
processing in about 40% of the patients in both patients’ groups.
The authors argue that although fMRI responses are only
neuronal correlates and do not show a causal relationship between
response and performance, they can be a reliable indicator for
preserved functions independent of the distinction between MCS
and UWS.
An additional question is concerning the specificity of
deactivation within the DMN. We have to keep in mind that
deactivation is altered in various mental diseases and pathological
states like Alzheimer’s disease [47], autism [48], and schizophrenia
[49]. However, this is not a specific problem of impaired
deactivation but applies to alterations in the DMN in general
(for further review see Broyd et al. [50]). Future studies must
explore if there are specific variations in properties of the DMN in
patients with DOC compared to other disorders like, e.g.,
Alzheimer’s disease.
In conclusion, the 3 main features of the default mode network
in patients with DOC are impaired: metabolism; functionality;
task-induced deactivation. MCS patients showed reduced deacti-
vation, while patients with UWS did not obtain any deactivation
pattern at all. Task-induced deactivation in medial regions of the
DMN seems to correspond with the level of consciousness. On the
single-subject level, patients with a deactivation pattern demon-
strated preserved activation in lIFG or left precentral regions,
which are associated with conscious processing [37]. Hence, in
addition to analyzing connectivity of the resting state network,
which correlates with the level of consciousness [30], and
metabolism, which is reduced [16,29], investigating task-induced
deactivation gives the opportunity to differentiate by selecting
those DOC patients with the ability to interrupt ongoing mental
processes to focus attention. Thus, the presence of a deactivation
pattern may supply additional evidence for conscious processing
and, therefore, may be quite suitable as a marker of preserved
aspects of consciousness. In future studies, deactivation should be
investigated in relation to the other features of the DMN to receive
a more detailed picture of resting state networks and their function
in DOC.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Activation during sentence processing in
patients in the left superior temporal gyrus. Images
display BOLD signal changes overlaid on the structural template
of each patient and transformed into standard MNI space. Results
are thresholded at p,0.001, uncorrected.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Activation in left inferior frontal and left
precentral gyrus in patients with a deactivation pattern.
Images display BOLD signal changes overlaid on the structural
template of each patient and transformed into standard MNI
space. Results are thresholded at p,0.001, uncorrected. Circles
show wide-spread lesions in frontal regions of patient UWS16.
(TIF)
Figure S3 Deactivation pattern of MCS07 and MCS08.
Images display BOLD signal changes overlaid on the structural
template of each patient and transformed into standard MNI
space. Results are thresholded at p,0.001, uncorrected.
(TIF)
Table S1 Coordinates of region of interest.
(PDF)
Table S2 Sum of deactivated voxels within the DMN
and sum of activated voxels within areas of higher-order
speech processing for controls and patients.
(PDF)
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